
Japanese Political Thought as Seen from Prime Minister's Speech : Koizumi's Singularity

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✧ Introduction

When taking office as the Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi was very often introduced and characterised in media as being the “maverick” in the Japanese politics. Besides hinting at some minor things like his hairstyle, this term was meant to express Koizumi's ideas on the political situation in Japan as well as his not very common behaviour as a Japanese politician. Now, after more than four years in office, it is interesting to take a closer look at his and his team's political ideas and way of thinking. This encouraged me to study more about and do a research on the political thought of Japanese prime ministers over the whole post-war period.

There is an impressive long term research on Japanese political thought done by a group of scientists led currently by Ikuo Kabashima⁽¹⁾, which concentrates on Japanese voters' behaviour, their perception of political parties and actual policies of the Japanese political parties (明るい選挙推進協会調査). According to Kabashima, Japanese voters have an accurate understanding of the ideological differences of the political parties and their position on the conservative (保守) – reform (革新) scale. Compared to 1960s and 1970s, where the opposition between these two was clearly distinguishable (concerning defence policy/attitude towards the old system and welfare/participation/equality questions), by the 1990s a strong trend towards de-ideologisation (脱イデオロギー化, using Murakami's term, see Murakami 1984) had taken place (see Kabashima *et. al.* 1996). Further, influenced by the realignment of the political parties (starting with Japan New Party in 1992), party loyalty was weakening and the distribution of voters' ideologies became more sharpened at the centre. Finally, it is pointed out, that the decision of which party to support, is not influenced by voters' geographical profiles or economic situation (in contrast to American or European societies) but is purely political decision (see also Abe *et. al.* 1997).

Conceptually very interesting is Hideo Otake's liberalist-social democratic cleavage. According to Otake, there is more essential ideological opposition than the usual Japanese conservative – reformist scale. As foreign and defence policies after the WW2 caused vehement argumentations, the extreme right and extreme left confrontation emerged, leaving no space to the more moderate (in the centre) liberalist and social democratic thought to have any influence. At the same time, concerning economic policy, the central moderate thought (mixing both liberal and social democratic thought) had the strongest influence (Otake 1996). Now, by 1990s, with the end of the Cold war and the so-called “1955 system”, the traditional policy cleavage disappeared but there were no other major complex of ideas or principles to replace it. There was some initiative to show the neo-liberal reform policies as the new dimension for confrontation, but it didn't quite work out that way because of structural difficulties inherent in Japanese society and economic system (Otake 1999).

Another important object to analyse is election pledge. As Yutaka Shinada points out, election pledges reveal the most urgent problems at the time and serve as a bridge between

the voters and each politician (Shinada 2000). He analyses the pledges of three elections in the 1990s (in 1990, 1993 and 1996). Two main trends in election rhetoric appeared—rhetoric emphasising the profit of the local area and, secondly, dealing with problems that Japan faces in general. The first was more common among the LDP politicians and the second among the politicians of the opposition. Now, the elections in 1993 brought a new topic—political reform, whereas in the 1996 elections reform in general became the most important issue. The election pledges did not show any conservative-reform cleavage concerning welfare issues.

My intention here is to analyse the political thought of the government, especially of the leader of the country and not that of the political parties of Japan, the electorate or individual politicians. This topic, however, has been mostly ignored, as can be seen for example from the IPSA database⁽²⁾. It is undeserved, I think, as prime minister/the government is one main actor and source of political thought. The way of thinking on the side of the electorate has to be (ideally) reflected in the way of thinking on the side of the government, but is that so in Japan? This question indicates the gap I try to fill with my research.

I decided to conduct an analysis on the prime minister's policy speeches. Speech is very interesting to analyse specially for two reasons. First, it has to express the views or plans of the speaker on one hand, but still be different from a concrete policy plan in using more illustrative and literary expressions in order to appeal the audience. Second, I chose the policy speeches because they are general and particular at the same time. They are general because the prime minister touches *all* the issues he considers important. They are particular, since the prime minister is expected to explain his plans in details to a certain extent for the following session of the diet. It is known that the prime minister speeches are written by a team lead by deputy chief cabinet secretary⁽³⁾ and the process takes usually two weeks or longer. However, the prime ministers (at least) revise the drafts of the speeches, and mostly write parts of their speeches by themselves. In any case, the final touch is added by the prime minister himself. But even if the extent of how much the prime minister personally contributes to his speech differs among the prime ministers, there is no reason to consider it as a problem in this research. It is for the reason that in this research I am not interested in prime minister's views as a person, but in his views as an office. In other words, the object here is to study the political thought of the government and not that of the individual politicians (including prime minister), nor political parties, electorate etc. At the same time the very fact that it is not the prime minister alone who writes the speeches, minimises the effects of personality and leadership styles. Seen from this perspective, the policy speech as a collective work constitutes even better objective for analysis than a prime minister's casual comments (to media for example) that may express more his personal views. In a word, my aim is to analyse the political thought on the side of government (as opposed to electorate and political parties) and for that, the policy speeches of prime ministers are very good material, as they are (1) group work, (2) very carefully compiled, and (3) touch all the questions that the government/prime minister considers important.

There is some research done on political language or the relationship between politics and words. However, this tends to concentrate on one or a couple of words (e.g. Ishida 1989) and is more in essayistic style (see also Maruyama 1961 and Tsuzuki Tsutomu 2004).

The term "political thought", if translated into Old-Greek, is "political ideology". But as the term "ideology" is not neutral but has too many different associations and connota-

tions, I am trying to avoid using it. Further, the meanings of the main ideological terms differ in space and time. What is considered liberal in the U.S. can mean socialist in Europe ; or what is reformist in Japan can translate into conservative in Finland. The same goes for time—there is a difference of how the same terms were/are understood in the era of Burke or Mill and in modern societies. In addition to that, in the modern societies new major topics have emerged that cannot be classified using the traditional ideological terms. For example, political participation or corruption and political ethics etc.

1. Methodology

For the reasons mentioned, I decided to take the starting point for the analysis from the minimal unit of analysis - the word. Otherwise, if I would code the speeches based on the traditional ideological terms, there would be the possibility of excluding and ignoring some important topics that are not easily classified by these terms.

As the first step of the analysis, I used a special Japanese language program “KHCoder” to get the frequency of the words of the prime ministers’ speeches, including all the policy speeches in the Parliament of all the prime ministers of the National Diet history. This is to say, starting from Katayama, Ashida, and Yoshida’s second term (as Yoshida served his first term as the Prime Minister of Imperial Diet of Japan) and concluding with Koizumi’s nine policy speeches held by now, all together 151 speeches by 25 prime ministers. This first step serves as a general basis against which to compare each and every prime minister’s word frequencies (see table 1) or, further, groups of prime ministers’ word frequencies. As the number of speeches and the length of the speeches of each prime minister differ, I also calculated the percentage points of each entry. Although the “total” means all the speeches of the 25 prime ministers and the percentages of the total, I will use the word “average” in the following explanation (when

comparing each prime minister against the total) for the sake of brevity.

As the second step, I conducted a principal component analysis (PCA) and multidimensional scaling (MDS) using SPSS. PCA is used to detect the structure in the relationships between variables, to classify variables. MDS is used to uncover the underlying structure of data, to detect the meaningful dimensions to explain the similarities and differences (Euclidean distances) between the investigated objects, i.e. between the prime ministers in their rhetoric in this research (see the details for using of these methods in SPSS Statistical Algorithms).

I also conducted hierarchical cluster analysis (the dendrogram), taking both prime ministers (25) and words (top 200 of each prime minister) as cases⁽⁴⁾.

The data provided for the analysis includes all the speeches of all the prime ministers (from Katayama to Koizumi), calculated in percentage points (“total”) ; and the margin difference of each of the prime ministers from the total, also, of course, in percentages. In this way, the prime ministers who have held many speeches, contribute to the general total more than the prime ministers with less or shorter speeches. This method is justified as it is clear that a prime minister like Nakasone (in office for almost 5 years) has influenced the political thought much more than for example Hata (in office not even 2 months).

Table 1 Example of the data of simple frequencies

Total				Nakasone			Miyazawa			Koizumi		
1	する	13923	6.32%	する	1479	6.57%	する	547	6.09%	する	1581	7.82%
2	ない	3201	1.45%	我国	266	1.18%	我国	133	1.48%	改革	310	1.53%
3	経済	2404	1.09%	ない	251	1.11%	ない	122	1.36%	ない	214	1.06%
4	国民	2398	1.09%	経済	240	1.07%	経済	105	1.17%	国民	179	0.89%
5	我国	2212	1.00%	改革	235	1.04%	社会	93	1.03%	社会	178	0.88%
6	ある	1956	0.89%	社会	218	0.97%	政治	90	1.00%	経済	161	0.80%
7	社会	1807	0.82%	ある	213	0.95%	世界	81	0.90%	進める	147	0.73%
8	国際	1537	0.70%	国民	209	0.93%	国民	79	0.88%	日本	126	0.62%
9	政府	1464	0.66%	世界	195	0.87%	国際	78	0.87%	ある	115	0.57%
10	世界	1311	0.59%	国際	191	0.85%	平和	72	0.80%	できる	112	0.55%
11	関係	1311	0.59%	図る	163	0.72%	ある	72	0.80%	なる	109	0.54%
12	問題	1238	0.56%	関係	160	0.71%	生活	70	0.78%	実現	106	0.52%
13	改革	1216	0.55%	協力	141	0.63%	問題	58	0.65%	支援	98	0.49%
14	平和	1176	0.53%	努力	140	0.62%	努力	57	0.63%	国際	96	0.48%
15	なる	1137	0.52%	日本	134	0.60%	実現	57	0.63%	我国	95	0.47%
16	努力	1107	0.50%	政府	130	0.58%	協力	55	0.61%	取組む	92	0.46%
17	政治	1096	0.50%	平和	123	0.55%	地域	54	0.60%	制度	90	0.45%
18	協力	1046	0.47%	さらに	122	0.54%	図る	54	0.60%	関係	90	0.45%
19	安定	939	0.43%	推進	120	0.53%	関係	53	0.59%	推進	87	0.43%
20	考える	898	0.41%	政治	116	0.52%	なる	50	0.56%	企業	85	0.42%
21	推進	872	0.40%	安定	115	0.51%	改革	49	0.55%	国	83	0.41%
22	日本	869	0.39%	なる	110	0.49%	環境	48	0.53%	構造	82	0.41%
23	できる	798	0.36%	問題	104	0.46%	今後	45	0.50%	地域	82	0.41%
24	生活	753	0.34%	考える	95	0.42%	向ける	43	0.48%	世界	82	0.41%
25	発展	745	0.34%	発展	94	0.42%	できる	43	0.48%	行う	81	0.40%
26	実現	736	0.33%	進める	91	0.40%	確保	41	0.46%	安全	80	0.40%
27	対策	734	0.33%	対策	87	0.39%	重要	38	0.42%	目指す	80	0.40%
28	進める	730	0.33%	一層	87	0.39%	取組む	36	0.40%	民間	79	0.39%
29	さらに	717	0.33%	実現	85	0.38%	整備	34	0.38%	向ける	77	0.38%
30	今後	694	0.31%	教育	84	0.37%	推進	34	0.38%	分野	76	0.38%
31	図る	685	0.31%	制度	83	0.37%	秩序	33	0.37%	問題	75	0.37%
32	必要	672	0.30%	基本	82	0.36%	大国	32	0.36%	整備	69	0.34%

2. Results

The results of the principal component analysis showed that all of the speeches of the 25 prime ministers over the time span of almost 60 years were similar ; that is, the analysis gave only one combination of variables, *i.e.* only one principal component.

This result can be explained by the fact, that all the speeches generally touch the same subjects - economy, defence, foreign relations etc. Further, I conducted a multidimensional scaling analysis. Compared to PCA, multidimensional scaling gives more readily interpretable solutions of lower dimensionality and does not depend on the assumption of a linear relationship between variables.

The multidimensional scaling showed very interesting results (see figure 1). It is possible to recognize that the positions of the prime ministers are defined in terms of time




Figure 1 The results of multidimensional scaling

in the horizontal scale⁽⁵⁾. Ashida and Katayama appear at the left end, going on to Tanaka and Miki on the relative centre and reaching to Mori and Koizumi at the right end.

As a whole, it is possible to identify four groups. First group are the seven prime ministers from late 1940s to early 1970s—Tetsu Katayama, Shigeru Yoshida, Ichiro Hatoyama, Tanzan Ishibashi, Nobusuke Kishi, Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato. The second group is smaller, consists of three prime ministers—Takeo Miki, Takeo Fukuda and Masayoshi Ohira, whereas Ohira and Fukuda appear closer to each other than to Miki. The third group is the largest one with nine persons—Yasuhiro Nakasone, Noboru Takeshita, Toshiaki Kaifu, Kiichi Miyazawa, Morihiro Hosokawa, Tsutomu Hata, Tomiichi Murayama, Ryutaro Hashimoto and Yoshiro Mori. However, there are three groups possible to identify within the third group, namely that of Nakasone and Takeshita as one, Hosokawa, Murayama and Miyazawa as second and that of Mori and Hashimoto as third.

Finally, Junichiro Koizumi builds up a fourth group with Sosuke Uno. Hitoshi Ashida, Kakuei Tanaka, Zenko Suzuki and Keizo Obuchi look like lonely players in this figure.

It must be further pointed out that generally the first speech of a prime minister differs quite remarkably from the following speeches of that person. Therefore, it is sensible not to take too much pain for explaining the logic behind Ashida's position being separate from Katayama and others in the first group; or why Uno seems to be the soul mate of Koizumi. Beside Ashida and Uno, also Ishibashi and Hata had time for only one speech.

Turning now to the differences of the vocabulary of the groups, the key word for the first group (Katayama through Sato) may be determined as “the people” (国民). Relative to the average “25 total” (all of the 25 prime ministers' data combined), all the seven prime ministers use the word 国民 more often than any other group (from Kishi's. 16% to Hatoyama's. 78% and Ishibashi's. 98%). On the other hand, the second and third group and also Koizumi use the word less frequently

and $- .51$ for “our country”; Ishibashi is similar with using “peace” $- .37\%$, “freedom” $- .20\%$ from the average, and Yoshida for “our country” with $- .16\%$ from the average.

Taken together, the first group of prime ministers, who held office right after the Second World War, can be characterised as concentrating fundamental political issues as indicated by words like “the people”, “government”, “the state”; and economic issues with “industry”, “trade”, “construction” and “production” being used far above the average. As the politicians of that time faced this kind of basic problems of state building, they were in most cases not eager to use big concepts like “freedom”, “peace” or “wealth” and “new” “era”. However, as some remarkable exceptions indicate, these issues were very sensitive, so the questions of freedom, relations with the US etc. were to be handled delicately. The most suitable for a keyword for this group is 国民 (“the people”) as in contrast with the other prime ministers in later years, these seven prime ministers used this word more frequently as the average.

The second group of prime ministers—Miki, Fukuda and Ohira—represents the era of the aftermath of the oil shock, inflation and severe economic slump, namely the second half of the 1970s. The keyword representing this group’s rhetoric would be “friendship” (友好) as no other prime minister has used it as frequently as the three of the second group. Other words that are characteristic for this group are “relations” (関係), “stability” (安定) and “cooperation” (協力), “mutuality” (相互). One way to explain this trend of concentrating on issues like friendship and Japanese mutual relations and cooperation with the world countries, is that there is always a need to distract people’s attention from the first priority difficulties, as the economic situation of that period might have been. The only terms concerning economy that this group uses more frequently than the average is “business conditions” (景気) and “depression” (不況). If seeing this term

in its context in the speeches, it becomes clear that very often these terms are bound with international issues, drawing attention to the fact that the depression is not only Japanese problem but a predicament of the whole industrialized nations’ family. From this perspective, it is also natural to concentrate of terms like cooperation and mutuality *etc.* to support a kind of positive feeling in the audience combined with an emphasis on responsibility as a member of this family of nations.

As a contrast to the first group (Katayama through Sato), these prime ministers don’t use the term “the people” (国民) too often (see Figure 1 above), Miki with $.13\%$ below the average, Fukuda $- .19\%$ and Ohira $- .28\%$.

As becomes apparent from the figure 4, Suzuki and Nakasone appear very close to the three prime ministers of the second group. However, since the positions and division of the 25 prime ministers as indicated on the figure 1 are not based only on keywords but the whole vocabulary used, we have to keep in mind the more general picture. Suzuki’s position is right between the second and third group. The similarities with Miki, Fukuda and Ohira became apparent. However, he differs remarkably from them with his frequent use of such words as “our country” (我が国), “administration” (行政), “budget” (予算) and “effort” (努力), which are his special characteristic words (he uses them more frequent than the average by a large margin). But also words like “peace” (平和) and most interestingly “society” (社会) and “do” (する), which brings him closer to the third group of Nakasone through Mori.

The differences between Suzuki and the third group become clear from the following paragraph with the discussion of the characteristics of the third group.

The third and biggest group is composed of nine prime ministers through 1980s and 1990s. Actually, as noted above, it is possible to separate these prime ministers into three subgroups—first Nakasone and Takeshita, sec-




Figure 4 The main characteristics of the second group

kawa and Murayama—are using “politics” (政治) surprisingly often (.5 ; .78 ; .45%, respectively), while the other subgroups are using it less than the average. However, Hata and Kaifu are both using it frequently (.72 and .30%, respectively), being thus similar to Miyazawa’s subgroup. These three prime ministers use also the words “lifestyle” (生活) (with a little reservation in the case of Murayama) and “local area” (地域) more frequent than others. Quite interestingly, however they are divided over “reform” with Miyazawa using it even less than average. Further, and maybe even more insightful, is to note the words the three all together refuse to repeat. Of course these include the key words of previous big groups like “the

people”, “government”, “the state” *etc.*, but they also include such words like “welfare” (福祉), “stability” (安定), “security” (安全), “democracy” (民主主義). And this so, regardless of whether one is the representative of the “conservative” LDP, the “social democratic” DSPJ or something new like the JNP.

The third subgroup—Hashimoto and Mori—most strongly uses the keywords “society” and “reform”, but also includes such characteristics as “all my power” (全力) and “structure” (構造), which are not frequently used last four years or so. Among the words that they both don’t use too often are interestingly enough words connected to international affairs, like “international” (国際), “the world/global” (世界), “peace” (平和),




Figure 5 The frequency of 社会, The order and patterns in the Legend correspond to the order of the columns of the chart

“our country” (我が国), “the US” (米国) etc. In the case of Mori, we can add “relations” (関係), “Japan—the US” (日米), “cooperation” (協力) etc.

3. Koizumi

I am going on discussing Koizumi’s vocabulary, i.e. his ideas and policies as appearing in his policy speeches keeping in the background the wider framework from Katayama to Mori, which was explained above.

As can be seen from the figure on the main characteristics of the third group (figure 6), Koizumi appears not too separate from that group (Nakasone through Mori). At the same time, the results of the multidimensional scaling indicated (see Figure 1 above), Koizumi stands distinctly apart from that group. The main reason behind this is Koizumi’s sig-

nificantly frequent usage of the verb “do” (する)⁽⁶⁾. Combined with his second most frequent word—“reform” he does not really fit to any group; particularly he seems rather opposite to the second group of Miki, Fukuda and Ohira. Closest to him stands Uno, not only with the way Uno uses the keywords of “do” and “reform”, but also the way neither of them uses “government” (政府), “parliament” (国会), “effort” (努力), “peace” (平和), “stability” (安定), “lifestyle” (生活), “relations” (関係), “policy” (政策), “measures” (施策) etc. However, as pointed out earlier, one should not draw wide range inferences from the position of a prime minister (the similarities and differences in relation to the other prime ministers) if he only had one speech in the parliament. Not only the fact that one speech can be considered statistically not relevant enough, but also that the first speech of a newly appointed prime minister tends to be notably different from his following speeches⁽⁷⁾. And Uno is one of the few who had just one speech delivered




Figure 6 The main characteristics of the third group

in front of the parliament⁽⁸⁾.

Going back to the figure 1, the category axis shows almost perfectly the way the prime ministers are using the word “do”—those above the axis use it more than the average, and those below use it less frequently. To say “almost perfectly” means that there are exceptions; most notably the case of Hata, who uses the word .51 less frequent than the average while positioning above the axis. But also the cases of Ikeda and Suzuki, who despite using the word more frequent than the average, are positioned below the category axis.

Until now, I have not paid much attention to the usage of verbs, but in the case of Koizumi, it cannot be avoided, as is apparent already from his keyword being a verb. Other verbs he uses often are all very active, strong and positive words such as “advance” (進める), “aim” (目指す), “can” (できる) and “tackle” (取り組む). In most cases the oppo-

site end, *i.e.* the prime ministers using these words least frequent among all, are those of the first group plus Ashida; to a certain extent and especially so in the case of “do” (as pointed out earlier) also those of the second group. Therefore, it seems that with the time the trend has grown to use positive active verbs to add strength and intensity to the speech. The one case that do not suit to this trend is that of “do” (する), which suggest that it is suitable for picking it as a keyword for characterization of different prime ministers.

On the other hand, as Koizumi’s case as well as the results of component matrix of the top 200 words analysis show, the opposite to “do” is not “be” (ある) or not even “become” (なる), but “think” (考える).




Figure 7 Koizumi's main characteristics "do" and "reform"

4. Political thought and policy agendas

In my more detailed research⁽⁹⁾ on Miyazawa and Koizumi, the two most prominent lines of today's political thought appeared clearly, namely, the liberal (Koizumi) and social democratic⁽¹⁰⁾ (Miyazawa). The first lays emphasis on small government, cuts in expenditures, promoting private sector *etc.*⁽¹¹⁾ The second supports rather big government, humanitarian and social agendas, but at the same time concentrates also on international relations mainly from the perspective of the "soft" issues like poverty, human rights *etc.*

Koizumi and Miyazawa are good cases for representing each of the discourses. However, the developments in the real political arena in

the post-war Japan have not showed any clear trends in respect of these two rather opposite currents of political thought.

The speedy growth to a high level of economic performance in the post war Japan has always been considered as the consequence of the liberal international market forces. Therefore, it is difficult to underestimate the general understanding and approval of liberal democratic ideology. In this context it is interesting to take a closer look at the development of the opposite-social democratic agenda in the speeches as well as in the policies implemented.

In the early years after the war, *i.e.* in the days of the first group of prime ministers as labelled in this paper, the pension and health insurance systems were to be built up. At first some special institutions were established, like the veterans' pension system in 1953 and right after that public employees' pension schemes ; thirdly the employees' pen-

sion insurance system in 1954¹²⁾ (Schmidt and Watanuki, 1993). After the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party (the LDP) and the Japan Socialist Party (the JSP), the expansion of the pension and health insurance systems to the whole population were proposed. By the 1970s, the institutional build-up of the social welfare system was considered to be completed as the children's allowances, free medical care for the aged, indexation to inflation *etc.* had been introduced. That of course also meant that the expenditure on social security and welfare had been increasing remarkably.

If now going back again to the policy speeches, the results of the analysis showed that social security and welfare were not a priority topic of the prime ministers of the first group. The first priority was given to economic questions and building up the political institutions. Katayama and Yoshida, but also Ashida did not even mention the issue of welfare and social security while Hatoyama mentioned the need to improve medical care systems and public aid in order to prevent social unrest (so not as a value in its own right). Only later, Sato and most famously Ikeda with his "Income doubling plan" touched to issue of social welfare directly. However, among all of the 25 prime ministers, the word "welfare" (福祉) have been used most (even if only .2% more frequent than the average) by Ishibashi and Tanaka.

Now the second group, that of Miki, Fukuda and Ohira, is most interesting and important to consider since the economic conditions sharply worsened in 1970s. On one hand, it might be argued that during a period of low economic growth the welfare budget is graded down to the minimum in order not to lay an additional burden on the economy. On the other hand, during depression the need for welfare spending is acute, so again it is politically very difficult to reduce the welfare budget.

At that time the term "Japanese-style welfare society" was coined, which meant that

the welfare and social security demands would be met not only by the government, but shared also with private firms, community and the family. However, this term was still used years later, for example by Nakasone during the period of the "bubble" economy. Therefore, this term does not directly translate to the economic policy agenda. It has its connotation also with promoting national feeling and supporting the positive characteristics of Japanese society as having strong community and family ties, as Nakasone's speeches indicate. For the same token, the characteristics of the three prime ministers of the second group were mostly tied to international issues of friendship, relations, mutuality *etc.*

Further, it is important to look at a "social democratic" government in its title, namely that of Murayama. It became apparent earlier that this group of prime ministers (Miyazawa, Murayama and Hosokawa) use words like "welfare" (福祉), "stability" (安定), "security" (安全), "democracy" (民主主義) less frequently than the average, regardless of the party affiliation. On the figure 1 above, Murayama stands closest to Miyazawa in his rhetoric. As pointed out above, Miyazawa as opposed to Koizumi can be characterised as being close to the social democratic thought. However, in an exclusive interview with Miyazawa, he denied any sympathy with social democratic agenda concerning economic policies. He stressed the importance of free market and free trade¹³⁾. Further, Murayama's most frequently used word is actually "reform" (改革).

Therefore, it is impossible to draw any divisive line between the "conservative" LDP and "social democratic" JSP or DSPJ in regard of the welfare policy. At the same time, it is not very clearly possible to draw the line even considering the economic situation. Thus there must be something still different and more hidden from the ordinary discourse of ideological study, for example personal leadership style, educational background or

the relationship with the bureaucracy, that make one or another prime minister seem to lean towards liberal or social democratic agenda.

5. Koizumi and other strong advocates of reform policies

Koizumi's keywords, as the analysis indicated, are "reform" and "do". Generally, he is conspicuous with using strongly active verbs, as argued above. In an attempt to group similar prime ministers in these terms with Koizumi, we are facing the reformists like Nakasone, but also Murayama, Hosokawa, Hata and Mori ; and "do" persons Kaifu, Tanaka and Nakasone. The question of what might be the common indicator of prime ministers like Koizumi and Murayama is actually not too difficult to answer. All of these prime ministers lack strong ties with the bureaucracy. They are "politician" types, who were elected to the House of Representatives or the House of Councillors very early, without or too little prior experience in the bureaucracy. Alternatively, they had been active in private sector before getting involved in politics.

It is further interesting to note, that the non-LDP prime ministers like Murayama, Hosokawa and Hata are advocates of reform policies, however they are sharply different from the others in terms of using the word "do" (する). Their most frequently used word is reform (or almost most frequent in the case of Hosokawa) and their least frequently used word is "do". The figures by Hosokawa are .49% above the average for "reform" while .50% below the average for "do"; the figures by Hata are +1.03% and -.51%, respectively ; and by Murayama +.57% and -.78%, respectively. It may be thus concluded that while these prime ministers see the need to reform the long-lasting LDP politics ;

and as non-LDP leaders, this would be their mission if taken from the point of view of the electorate. However, they lack a certain assertiveness and courage to appeal strongly to the audience of their speeches.

Now, the other prime ministers like Nakasone and Tanaka are more similar to Koizumi as they are assertive and active in their style of speech.

In the 1980s the wide-spread way of thinking in the United States and Great Britain as well as in Nakasone's Japan advocated small government, privatization, deregulation and as such can be characterised as liberal (*laissez-faire*) ideology. In Japan, this agenda was commonly called, somewhat misleadingly as Otake points out (Otake 1993), administrative reform. This was reflected in Nakasone's Minkatsu (民活) policy (that is inviting private capital into public work projects) and deregulating land use. The opinion towards land use issue was divided in the Ministry of Construction. The so-called "deregulators" emphasised increasing available land for building through market incentives and demanded deregulation in land use. The "regulators" comprised the mainstream officials in the ministry in charge of the land use policy from the late 1960s. They had established the system of publicising land prices and argued for the absorption of windfall profits (the return to the public of any increase in the value of real estate arising from government action (開発利益の社会還元) (*ibid.*)). The prime minister's "direct instructions" were decisive in that deregulation to become the official policy (however the opposition in the ministry slowed down the deregulation policy progress).

Largely the same developments can be observed in Nakasone's Minkatsu policies. By the latter half of the 1980s, the participants of the Minkatsu included not just the real estate and construction industries but also the mainstream business community. Nakasone advocated giant projects like the Trans - Tokyo Bay Highway or the Akashi Straits

Bridge to be handled under the Minkatsu agenda. However, the Ministry of Construction and the LDP construction zoku insisted that a semi-public Public Road Corporation would be made the nucleus.

On the background of these examples of Nakasone's policies, it becomes evident why he was using positive assertive vocabulary (being the "do" faction) with the keywords "reform" (also the words like "international", "the world", "cooperation" *etc.*). As his career in the bureaucracy was very short⁽¹⁴⁾ and as a prime minister went often against the bureaucracy, he could not afford to be feeble and soft-spoken (even if the results of his policies did not quite match the liberal principles⁽¹⁵⁾ he was advocating).

The same way, neither Koizumi nor Tanaka has (had) very strong and long-established ties with the bureaucracy. Instead, they serve as strong politician type prime ministers. By contrast, the leaders with strong bureaucratic background (like Fukuda or Miyazawa for example) tend to be technically proficient, often issue oriented and relatively passive in leadership style⁽¹⁶⁾.

6. Conclusion

The principal component analysis of the prime minister's policy speeches of almost 60 years in the Japanese parliament showed that the rhetoric of the 25 prime ministers have been too similar to mark any trends or deviations as the analysis gave only one combination of variables, *i.e.* only one principal component. This result can be explained by the fact, that all the speeches generally touch the same subjects—economy, defence, foreign relations *etc.* I further conducted a multidimensional scaling analysis that helped to group the prime ministers mostly into four groups. First group comprises of seven prime minis-

ters from late 1940s to early 1970s—Tetsu Katayama, Shigeru Yoshida, Ichiro Hatoyama, Tanzan Ishibashi, Nobusuke Kishi, Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato. This group can be characterised by using words like "people" (国民), "parliament" (国会), "the state" (国家), "democracy" (民主主義) and "cabinet" (内閣) more than the average of the 25 prime ministers. They also use distinctively more frequently the vocabulary of economic affairs like "industry" (産業), "production" (生産), "trade" (貿易) or "construction" (建設). As this was the period of state building after the Second World War, the issues of the government and economy were the first priorities. As the politicians of that time faced this kind of basic problems of state building, they were in most cases not eager to use big concepts like "freedom", "peace" or "wealth" and "new" "era". However, as some remarkable exceptions indicated, these issues were very sensitive, so the questions of freedom, relations with the US *etc.* were to be handled delicately. The most suitable for a keyword for this group is 国民 ("the people") as in contrast with the other prime ministers in later years, these seven prime ministers used this word more frequently as the average.

The second group is smaller, consists of three prime ministers—Takeo Miki, Takeo Fukuda and Masayoshi Ohira. The keyword representing this group's rhetoric would be "friendship" (友好) as no other prime minister has used it as frequently as the three of the second group. Other words that are characteristic for this group are "relations" (関係), "stability" (安定) and "cooperation" (協力), "mutuality" (相互). The only terms concerning economy that this group uses more frequently than the average is "business conditions" (景気) and "depression" (不況). The context shows that very often these terms are bound with international issues, drawing attention to the fact that the depression is not only Japanese problem but a predicament of the whole industrialized nations' family. From this perspective, it is also natural to

concentrate of terms like cooperation, mutuality *etc.* to support a kind of positive feeling in the audience combined with an emphasis on responsibility as a member of this family of nations.

The third group is the largest one with nine persons - Yasuhiro Nakasone, Noboru Takeshita, Toshiki Kaifu, Kiichi Miyazawa, Morihiro Hosokawa, Tsutomu Hata, Tomiichi Murayama, Ryutaro Hashimoto and Yoshiro Mori. The keyword for the third group is "society" (社会) as all of the nine prime ministers use this more than average. Other words more frequently used include "reform" (改革), "local area" (地域), "problem issue" (課題). It is possible to separate these prime ministers into three subgroups - first Nakasone and Takeshita, second, a group of three, Miyazawa, Hosokawa and Murayama, and finally third, Hashimoto and Mori.

Finally, Junichiro Koizumi builds up a fourth group with Sosuke Uno; whereas Hitoshi Ashida, Kakuei Tanaka, Zenko Suzuki and Keizo Obuchi are different enough from all of the groups. However, it is not possible to make far-reaching conclusions on this statistical finding as Uno had only one speech for the analysis. The characteristics of Koizumi is his significantly frequent usage of the verb "do" (する) combined with his second most frequent word - "reform" (改革). He seems rather opposite to the second group of Miki, Fukuda and Ohira. Beside "do" the verbs Koizumi uses often are all very active, strong and positive words such as "advance" (進める), "aim" (目指す), "can" (できる) and "tackle" (取り組む). The analysis indicates that with the time the trend to use assertive verbs has grown to add strength and intensity to the speech. On the other hand, as Koizumi's case as well as the results of component matrix of the top 200 words analysis show, the opposite to "do" is not "be" (ある) or not even "become" (なる), but "think" (考える).

My attempt to draw any divisive line between the "conservative" LDP and "social

democratic" JSP or DSPJ did not bare any fruit. Conspicuously, the group of Miyazawa, Murayama and Hosokawa use words like "welfare" (福祉), "stability" (安定), "security" (安全), "democracy" (民主主義) less frequently than the average, regardless of the party affiliation. At the same time, it was not possible either to draw the line when considering the economic situation.

In an attempt to group similar prime ministers with Koizumi, the reformists like Nakasone, but also Murayama, Hosokawa, Hata and Mori appear; and "do" persons Kaifu, Tanaka and Nakasone. They are all "politician" types, who were elected to the House of Representatives or the House of Councillors very early, without prior experience in the bureaucracy. Alternatively, they had been active in private sector before getting involved in politics. The non-LDP prime ministers like Murayama, Hosokawa and Hata were advocates of reform policies, however they were sharply different from the others in terms of not using the word "do" (する). Thus, these prime ministers saw the need to reform the long-lasting LDP politics; and as non-LDP leaders, this would be their mission if taken from the point of view of the electorate. However, they lack a certain assertiveness and courage to appeal strongly to the audience of their speeches.

Taken together, the political thought on the side of the prime minister/the government is not very easily projected to the traditional left-right or conservative-social democratic (or liberal as Otake uses) confrontation. This is obviously due to the characteristics of the Japanese economic and social structures (as Otake pointed out), especially due to the fact that most of the prime ministers are affiliated with the same political party. The non-LDP prime ministers were advocates of reform, which in itself is not the determining factor for left-right division. Thus, even if the Japanese electorate is conscious about this kind of division (locating the LDP to the right and the JSP/DSPJ and

Communists to the left ; further being able to locate their own personal opinion in the same framework), as Kabashima *et al.* show, this is not reflected in the political thought of the prime ministers as seen from their policy speeches.

Finally, as apparent from the first figure already, Koizumi seems rather distant from the other prime ministers in his rhetoric. So the hopes (or fears?) of those who called him “maverick” four years ago have been fulfilled, at least in terms of his speeches.

[注]

- (1) Ichiro Miyake, Joji Watanuki have led the research in the past. See also Miyake 1985 and 2001 and Watanuki 1977, 1986 or 1991
- (2) According to the IPSA database, recent work has been concentrated on either special topics-like war, defeat, hate *etc.* or one special speech. For the former, see *e.g.* Corcoran’s “Presidential Concession Speeches: the Rhetoric of Defeat” or Northcutt’s “An analysis of Bush’s War Speech”; for the latter, see *e.g.* Pitney’s “President Clinton’s 1993 Inaugural Address” or Sung “Jiang Zemin’s Eight-point Speech and Cross-Strait Relations in the Post-Deng Era”. In any case, most of this research concentrates on the United States and the US presidential speeches, and I have not been able to find anything similar done on Japanese post-war prime ministers.
- (3) As I was able to confirm while interviewing former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa (April 16, 2004) and former deputy chief cabinet secretary Shinzo Abe (April 11, 2005).
- (4) For analysing speeches I have previously used also a Japanese language dictionary 日本語彙体系 to group similar words and synonyms into categories. For example, “democracy” (民主主義), “imperialism” (帝国主義), “ideology” (イデオロギー) *etc.* would count as one category and not three different entries. For the same token, synonyms like 制度, 仕組み, 体系, 体制, シス

テム, *etc.* would constitute one category. However, as generalizations always blur the concrete, I decided to go back to the basic unit-the word.

- (5) It is of course known that the MDS do not pick one component to be the axis. It rather measures the distances between the objects and, as a method, includes “rotating” of the axes ; so instead of looking at the axes, we have look at the map as whole to see the similarities and differences (that is the distances) of the objects.
 - (6) By now, the question may have risen about the meaning of for example the. 5% or 1% (*etc.*) at the figures and explanations. We have to keep in mind hereby that we cannot compare these numbers in absolute terms. If we take the average at 6.3% (as in the case of する) it would be 50% of the distribution. Increasing it by 0.5% (to 6.8), would include 76% of the distribution ; increasing it further 0.5% (to 7.3) would include 92% of the distribution, as calculated using cumulative distribution function (CDF). That shows that the first 0.5% increases the distribution more (by 26%) than the latter 0.5% (only by 16%). Thus, the “weight” of 0.5% or 1% *etc.* differs depending on its distance from the average ; which means that we cannot talk about the meaning of *e.g.* 1% in absolute terms but only relatively.
- Further, I also analysed the distribution and kurtosis of single words. We can say that the curve for する is rather peaked (with kurtosis excess being 1.3%) (however with the average at 6.3%, Koizumi with his 7.8 percentage points locates himself quite to the extreme) ; at the same time the curve for 改革 for example, is very low with the kurtosis being -1.15%. A further analysis still needed to see all the implications from these calculations.
- (7) It might be rather interesting to analyse separately all the first speeches of the 25 prime ministers, as it can be argued that these first speeches might show more of the prime minister’s own way of thinking and less that of the bureaucracy ; also, as the newly appointed prime minister has not

yet lost his enthusiasm (that apparently usually happens after a while of difficulties or failures), the first speeches can also show the true intent and scope of planned policies of that prime minister. However, this task stands out of the limits of this paper.

- (8) I conducted a further analysis that excluded the first speeches of all the prime ministers. Doing so, I naturally excluded also those prime ministers who had only one speech. The results deserve more detailed analysis, but stated simply here : (1) the first group includes Tanaka ; at the same time seems even more distant from other groups, especially from the second group ; (2) the second group stays together as it was ; (3) the third group is not possible to divide into 3 subgroups any more. It has a stronger nucleus of Nakasone, Kaifu, Hashimoto and Mori ; whereas Miyazawa-Murayama-Hosokawa group gets more dispersed between Takeshita and Obuchi ; (4) Koizumi is still a lonely player. In this article, however, I still included all the prime ministers, as it is only my personal opinion (based on reading the speeches) that the first speeches tend to differ from the following speeches, and it does not rely on any particular research, and so I have no academically justified reason to exclude these speeches.
- (9) "Japanese Political Ideology : Content Analysis of the Speeches of Prime Minister K. Miyazawa and Prime Minister J. Koizumi" (2004)
- (10) Concerning the word "social", there can be certain distrust or uneasiness in using this word. The Soviet Union's experiment with socialism left a dark shadow over the socialist discourse. In many parts of the word, the mere name of social democracy may raise objections to the line of thought because of its connotations with socialism. However, it can be argued that the basic question of whether state policy should support the (small number of) strong individuals guaranteeing the equality of the starting position or it should support (as great a number as possible of) the weaker

groups seeking a kind of sensible equality of the result, has its roots much deeper in the history. The cleavage between the rights and liberties of an individual on one hand and the "greatest happiness for the greatest number" on the other had emerged half a century before Marx was even born. Therefore, one way to support the social democratic and welfare state agenda is to trace it back to the utilitarian thought of Bentham and James Mill

- (11) There may be a general impression that Koizumi (especially in his early days as Prime Minister) emphasised a lot on personal freedoms and liberties. However, the analysis on the policy speeches did not indicate that trend.
- (12) However, most of the labour force was not still covered with these schemes since as late as 1955, 25% of the labour force was self-employed and another 31% consisted of unpaid family workers. Only by the end of the 1980s, unpaid family workers comprised 9% of the labour force and the self-employed had shrunk to 15% (Allinson, 1993).
- (13) And yet, at the same time, in his view, the state's (government's) task is to "make people happy", which ultimately still represents a kind of "wall to wall" approach, of giving everybody something.
- (14) And he won a seat in the House of Representatives at a very early age (being 28, in 1947)
- (15) As is the case with Minkatsu, since small government principle was seen as its cornerstone, but actually it resulted in raising the expectations towards big government.
- (16) The distinction between these two types is indicated by Calder (see Calder 1982). He is actually concentrating on the brokerage skills of the prime ministers, comparing Fukuda and Tanaka. (By "brokerage" Calder means the act of meditating between private sector groups or individuals desiring direct material benefits or regulatory actions conferring such benefits, on the one hand, and governmental bodies perceived capable of providing such services, on the other ; in other words, it is the me-

diating role of politicians in “pork-barrel politics”.) Therefore, Calder says, Fukuda succeeded despite his diffident, low-key and often passive approach, waiting for private groups to come to him or his representatives to solve the issue. “Fukuda has been able to concentrate, in his intra-party activities, on policy definition in the fashion of the classic eighteenth - and nineteenth-century British statesmen” (*ibid.* p. 11). Tanaka, on the other hand, has been forced by his “lowly origins” to aggressively “sell on”, *i.e.* to place others in his debt by seeking to do them favours. His brokerage has consisted not so much of passively mediating among contending positions, or formulating abstract policy, as in giving and demanding favours.

Two key elements decide the success as a broker. First, an independent power base, usually financial, that provides initial resources to facilitate brokerage. Second, institutionalised connections with key parts of the existing power structure, that allows them to influence that structure when necessary. The greater their financial backing and the stronger their bureaucratic connections, the more influential brokers have been in national decision - making. This could serve as a hint to understand the way Koizumi’s policies have developed as they have.

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